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BITE MARK EVIDENCE j\J~ \ 2\986 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of law 
Case Western Reserve University 
In State v. Sapsford, 22 Ohio App.3d 1, 488 N.E.2d 218 
(1986), a rape victim was found with bite marks on her 
body. One suspect was arrested but then released when 
his dentition did not match the bite marks. A second sus-
pect, Sapsford, was subsequently arrested and ordered 
by the municipal court to submit to the production of den-
tal casts, close-up photographs of the edges of his teeth, 
and wax impressions of his bite. He then pleaded guilty 
and challenged the taking of models of his dentition on 
constitutional grounds. The court of appeals rejected 
these challenges. 
Sapsford appears to be the first reported Ohio case 
involving bite mark evidence. Other jurisdictions, howev-
er, have considered the issue on numerous occasions. 
The trial of Ted Bundy for the murder of two Florida State 
University coeds is probably the most publicized case in-
volving bite mark evidence. Bundy v. State, 455 So.2d 
330, 348-49 (Fla. 1984). This article examines the use of 
forensic dentistry at criminal trials, including the admissi-
bility of bite mark evidence. 
< ' 
...... :· .. 
FORENSIC DENTISTRY 
Forensic dentistry, also known as forensic odontology, 
concerns the application of dentistry to law. See I. Soph-
er, Forensic Dentistry vii (1976)("the application of dentis-
try to the legatstructure"); Ketlser-Nielsen, Forensic 
Odontology, 1 U. Tol. L. Re~.''633,, 634 (1969)("Forensic 
odontology is that branch of odqjjrblogy which ... deals 
with the proper handling and e~tr.ination of dental evi-
dence and with the proper evalu~tion and presentation of 
deljltal findings."). In criminal trials, forensic dentistry typ-
; ically is used in two ways: (1) to establish the identity of a 
homicide victim, and (2) to identify a defendant through a 
comparison of his dentition with bite marks found on the 
victim. 
IDENTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE VICTIM 
The identification of deceased persons by means of 
their dentition is sometimes the only method by which 
identity can be established. Although identification by 
fingerprints is a superior method of establishing identity, 
that method cannot be used when the skin tissue of the 
decedent's fingers is no longer available or when the 
decedent's fingerprints have never been previously re-
corded. In contrast to skin tissue, human dentition (as 
well as dental restorations and protheses) remains long 
after death. I. Sopher, supra, at 40-41. 
Dental identification is based on the theory that every 
person's dentition is unique. The human adult dentition 
consists of thirty two teeth, each with five anatomic sur-
faces. Thus, there are 160 dental surfaces that may con-
tain identifying characteristics. Restorations alone, with 
varying shapes, sizes, and restorative materials, may 
offer numerous points of individuality. In addition to resto-
rations, the number of teeth, prostheses, decay, malposi-
tion and malrotation, peculiar shapes, root canal therapy, 
bone patterns, bite relationship, and oral pathology all 
may provide identifying characteristics. /d. at 82. One 
study has established the uniqueness of human dentition 
through a statistical analysis. Rawson, Ommen, Kinard, 
Johnson & Yfantis, Statistical Evidence for the Individuali-
ty of the Human Dentition, 29 J. Forensic Sci. 245, 252 
(1984)("This mathematical evaluation of a general popu-
lation sample demonstrates the uniqueness of the hu-
man dentition beyond any reasonable doubt ... "). 
Comparative Analysis 
The identification involves a comparison of antemor-
tem records and postmortem findings to determine 
points of identity. The antemortem records may consist of 
written records (including charts), x-rays, and models. 
Radiographs are particularly helpful because they pro-
vide details not usually present in dental charts and they 
do not contain the errors that are found in charts. Stim-
son, Radiology in Forensic Odontology, 48 Dental Radi-
ography & Photography 51, 53-55 (1975). Without a puta-
tive identity, however, there is no way to obtain these rec-
ords; dental records are not maintained in one central de-
pository as are fingerprints. I. Sopher, supra, at 41 ("Ante-
mortem dental records, unlike fingerprints, are not easily 
obtained and recorded, are not centrally classified and 
are not readily retrievable for comparison."). Even when 
records are available, a positive identification may not be 
possible if the records are incomplete or inaccurate. The 
amount and condition of the postmortem dentition avail a-
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blefor comparison will ?.lsoaffect wheth(:)r a positive 
identification can be made. ld at ch. 5 & 7. 
There are no rninirnurn points of identity necessary to 
establish an identification. Stimson, supra, at 53 ('There 
are no specific number of concordant points necessary 
for positive identification."). The number and quality of 
points determine whether a positive identification rnay be 
made; a few points involving unusual characteristics rnay 
be sufficient: "[T]he recovery of only a single tooth or jaw 
fragment rnay bear the degree of specificity necessary 
for positive identification." I. Sopher, supra, at 41. See 
also Stimson, supra, at 53 ("If one filling is extremely 
unique, it could be specific."). However, there must be no 
unexplained inconsistencies. I. Sopher, supra, at 107. For 
exarn_ple, a missing tooth in the postmortem dentition is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the presence of that 
tooth in the antemortem records. The tooth rnay have 
carne out after the records were completed, including 
after death. In contrast, a missing tooth in the antemor-
tem records is inconsistent with the presence of that 
tooth in the postmortem dentition. See Sperber, Forensic 
Odontology, in Practising Law Institute, Scientific and Ex-
pert Evidence 721, 731 (2d ed. 1981). 
Admissibility 
The courts have accepted dental identification as a 
means of establishing the identity of a homicide victim. 
See People v. Westlake, 106 Cal. App. 247, 289 P. 212 
(1930); Wooley v. People, 148 Colo. 392, 367 P.2d 903 
(1961); State v. Johnston, 621daho 601, 113 P.2d 809 
(1941); Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Gush.) 
295, 52 Arn. Dec. 711 (1850); State v. Goodson, 299 Mo. 
321, 252 S.W. 389 (1923); Hawkins v. State, 60 Neb. 380, 
?~3_f\J_.'['f: !§1~_(1900); Lindsay v. People, 63 N.Y. 143 (1875); 
Fields v. State, 322 P.2d 431 (Okla. Crirn. 1958); William-
son v. State, 679 S.W.2d 523, 529-30 (Tex. App.1983), 
rev'd on other grounds, 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crirn. App. 
1984). See also An not., 86 A.L.R.2d 722 (1979). 
According to one court, "it cannot be seriously disput-
ed that a dental structure rnay constitute a means of 
identifying a deceased person ... where there is some 
dental record of that person with which the structure rnay 
be compared." People v. Mattox, 96 Ill. App.2d 148, 
150-51, 237 N.E.2d 845, 846 (1968). In another case, the 
court upheld the identification of skeletal remains by a 
forensic odontologist based on a comparison of the re-
mains and inter vivos photographs of the victim. Accord-
ing to the expert, the facial structure, occlusion, and the 
shape of the teeth and jaw permitted an identification. Ex 
parte Dolvin, 391 So.2d 677 (Ala. 1980). In addition, 
courts have held that a decedent's dental records are ad-
missible as business records. E.g., Williamson v. State, 
679 S.W.2d 523, 529 (Tex. App. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1984). 
BITE MARK ANALYSIS 
Bite mark analysis is a relatively new but important 
method of identification. One study reported that bite 
marks occur primarily in sex-related crimes, child abuse 
cases, and offenses involving physical altercations. Vale 
& Noguchi, Anatomical Distribution of Human Bite Marks 
in a Series of 67 Cases, 28 J. Forensic Sci. 61 (1983). 
Identification of a suspect by matching his dentition 
with a bite mark found on the victim of a crime rests on 
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the theory that each person's dentition is unique. See 
general/ySognnaes, Rawson, Gratt & Nguyen, Computer 
Comparison of Bitemark Patterns in Identical Twins, 105 J. 
Am. Dental A. 449 (1982). In this respect, bite mark com-
parisons are based on the same principle as the identifi-
cation of a deceased person. See People v. Milone, 43 Ill. 
App.3d 385, 397, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (1976)("The con-
cept of identifying a suspect by matching his dentition to 
a bite mark found at the scene of a crime is a logical ex-
tension of the accepted principle that each person's den-
tition is unique."). The courts have accepted this theory. 
See People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385, 396-97, 356 
N_.E;~?sl 1~§0, 135_8 (1976); Statev. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 
573'(Mo. CCApp:-19ffO), cert. denied,450 U.S. 910 (1981); 
People v. Smith, 110 Misc.2d 118, 125,443 N.Y.S.2d 551, 
556-57 (Cty. Ct. 1981)("The basic premise is the unique 
nature of individual dentition ... and the virtually infinite 
number of individual bite configurations."); State v. 
Green, 305 N.C. 463, 471,290 S.E.2d 625, 630 (1982); 
State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 11-13, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280-81 
(1981). 
There are, however, significant differences in the appli-
cation of these two methods. One authority has noted the 
following problems with bite mark analysis: 
[Bite]marks can never be taken to reproduce accurately the 
dental features of the originator. This is due partially to the 
fact that bite marks generally include only a limited number 
of teeth. Furthermore, the material (whether foodstuff or hu-
man skin) in which the mark has been left is usually found to 
be a very unsatisfactory impression material with shrinkage 
and distortion characteristics that are unknown. Finally, 
these marks represent only the remaining and fixed picture 
of an action, the mechanism of which may vary from case to 
case. For instance, there is as yet no precise knowledge of 
the possible differences between biting off a morsel of food 
and using one's teeth for purposes of attack or defense. 
Keiser-Nielson, supra, at 636. 
None of these problems is involved with dental identifica-
tions. In sum, bite mark identification depends not only 
on the uniqueness of each person's dentition but also on 
"whether there is a [sufficient] representation of that 
uniqueness in the mark found on the skin or other inani-
mate object." Rawson, Ommen, Kinard, Johnson & Yfan-
tis, supra, at 252. 
Methods of Comparison 
Several methods of bite mark analysis have been pro-
posed. See I. Sopher, supra, at 125-26; State v. Sager, 
600 S.W.2d 541, 569-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)(outlining dif-
ferent methods), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981). All 
methods involve three steps: (1) registration of the bite 
mark and the suspect's dentition, (2) comparison of the 
dentition and bite mark, and (3) evaluation of the points 
of similarity or dissimilarity. 
Registration of the bite mark by photography is used in 
all cases; the photographs are then enlarged to life-size 
proportion for comparison. Where bite indentations 
(three-dimensional bite marks) are present in the skin 
tissue, impressions may be obtained; these are used to 
reproduce models of the bite mark, which can be used 
for comparison. The defendant's dentition is reproduced 
by means of models. The reproductions of the bite mark 
and the defendant's dentition are then analyzed through 
a variety of different methods, including transparent over-
lays, direct comparison of photographs, or direct compar 
ison of photographs with models. Sperber, supra, at 
744-46. New techniques, including computerized bite 
analysis, have been reported. See Beckstead, Rawson & 
Giles, Review of Bite Mark Evidence, 99 J. Am. Dental A. 
69, 72 (1979); Sognnaes, Rawson, Gratt & Nguyen, 
supra, at 450 (citing a recent case in which computerized 
bite analysis was admitted in evidence). 
Expert Opinion Testimony 
Although the expert's conclusions are based.on objec-
tive data, the opinion is essentially a subjective one. See 
Sobel, Forensic Odontology, in 2 Forensic Sciences 
28-32 (C. Wecht ed. 1985); I. Sopher, supra, at 140. Like 
fingerprint and firearms identifications, the conclusions 
are based on the examiner's experience and expertise. 
Thus, the qualifications of the expert are critical. The 
American Board of Forensic Odontology has established 
certification standards in this field. 
It is easier to conclude that two bite marks are incom-
patible and therefore were not made by the same person, 
than it is to conclude that the mark has been made by a 
particular person. See Keiser-Nielson, supra, at 637-38; I. 
Sopher, supra, at 140; Sperber, supra at 752. This is due 
to the fact that any unexplained inconsistency between 
the bite mark and the dentition means that the suspect 
could not have made the bite mark. See Sperber, supra, 
at 747. A positive identification, however, may still be 
possible even though some inconsistencies are present, 
provided the inconsistencies can be explained. One 
commentator has written: 
There may, of course, be slight variations that are consistent 
-i.e., all of the bite marks are on a larger (or smaller) arch 
than the teeth themselves. In other words, depending on the 
location of the bite marks, whether the person (victim or sus-
pect) was passive, unconscious, or struggling, the degree of 
sucking that occurred during the biting and manual manipu-
lation, the forensic odontologist may be able to explain "con-
sistent variations" in the comparison. /d. at 747-48. 
There is no accepted minimum number of points of 
identity required for a positive identification. See Keiser-
Nielson, supra, at 637-38. The experts who have testified 
in bite mark cases have used a low of eight points of 
comparison to a high of fifty two points. E.g. State v. 
Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1978)(10 points); 
People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App.3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 
(1978)(10 points); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385, 356 
N.E.2d 1350 (1976)(29 points); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 
541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)(52 points), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
910 (1981); State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 S.E.2d 625 
(1982)(14 points); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 
273 (1981)(8 points); Kennedy v. State, 640 P.2d 971 
(Okla. Grim. App. 1982)(40 points); State v. Jones, 273 
S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979)(37 points). 
The conclusions that an expert can draw from the eval-
uation depend on the number and quality of the points of 
comparison. In some cases experts have testified only 
that a bite mark is consistent with the defendant's teeth. 
E.g. People v. Watson, 75 Cal. App.3d 384, 400-01, 142 
Cal. Rptr. 134, 143 (1977); People v. Williams, 128 Ill. 
App.3d 384, 397-98, 470 N.E.2d 1140, 1150 (1984)("the 
defendant could have made the bite mark"); Bludsworth 
v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 291 n.1, 646 P.2d 558, 559 n.1 
(1982); People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 271, 484 
N.Y.S.2d 577, 580-81 (1984); State v. Routh, 30 Or. App. 
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901, 903,568 P.2d 704, 705 (1977)("similarity"). 
In other cases experts have testified that it is "highly 
probable" or "very highly probable" that the defendant 
made the mark. E.g., People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App.3d 611, 
621, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 67 (1978); People v. Johnson, 8 Ill. 
App.3d 457, 461, 289 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1972). In still other 
cases experts have made positive identifications. E.g., 
People v. Milone, 43111. App.3d 385, 392-93, 356 N.E.2d 
1350, 1355-56 (1976); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 564 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); 
State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 10, 273 S.E.2d 273, 279 
(1981). 
In one case the expert stated his conclusion in terms of 
probability theory, testifying that "there is an eight in one 
million probability that the teeth marks found on the de-
ceased's breasts were not made by appellant." State v. 
Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 258, 585 P.2d 563, 566 (1978). 
Such a statement appears to be without scientific foun-
dation. The dissenting opinion contains the following 
comment: "[W]hile Dr. Campbell may have a great deal 
of expertise in the actual comparison techniques of bite-
mark identification, he is totally out of his field when the 
discussion turns to probability theory." /d. at 260, 585 
P.2d at 568. See also C. McCormick, Evidence 654 (3d 
ed. 1984). As one commentator has noted: 
The problem of specificity in the bite mark analysis results 
from the. lack of a scientific core of basic data for compari-
son. The results of the bite mark comparison may indicate a 
perfect or reasonably perfect fit between the bite mark and a 
suspect's dentition; however, how can one be absolutely or 
even perhaps reasonably certain that no other individual 
could have produced a particular bite? Classified bite mark 
characteristics on large segments of the population are una-
vailable; therefore, an absolute scientific estimation of speci-
ficity regarding the particular bite mark/suspect comparison 
is not possible. The situation is comparable to the point in 
the distant past when the 100th set of fingerprints was clas-
sified. At the time, it was known that the set of prints did not 
match the ninety-nine others previously recorded, but it was 
not known if the set of prints were specific for only the one 
individual fingerprinted. I. Sopher, supra, at 140. 
Although most experts and courts have accepted the 
reliability of bite mark evidence, this acceptance is not 
universal. Two commentators have recently written: 
There is effectively no valid documented scientific data to 
support the hypothesis that bite marks are demonstrably 
unique. Additionally, there is no documented scientific data 
to support the hypothesis that a latent bite mark, like a latent 
fingerprint, is a true and accurate reflection of this unique-
ness. To the contrary, what little scientific evidence that does 
exist clearly supports the conclusion that crime-related bite 
marks are grossly distorted, inaccurate, and therefore 
unreliable as a method of identification. Wilkinson & 
Gerughty, Bite Mark Evidence: Its Admissibility is Hard to 
Swallow, 12 West. St. U. L. Rev. 519, 560 {1985). 
Disagreement Among Experts 
Given these factors-the newness of the technique 
and its subjective character-it is not surprising to find 
qualified experts disagreeing in individual cases. E.g., 
State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 563-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); People v. 
Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 265-70, 484 N.Y.S.2d 577, 
580-83 (1984); Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857, 862 
(Tex. Grim. App. 1974); State v. Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 65, 386 
A.2d 1125, 1132 (1978). In some cases the experts have 
arrivedatdie~rnetrically opposed conclusions, while in 
others they disagree only on whether the data is suffi-
cient to support a positive identification. People v. Mil-
one; 43=111:CApp;3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976), is an 
example. In that case three experts testified for the 
prosecution and four testified for the defense. The prose-
cution experts all positively identified the defendant's 
teeth as the source of the bite mark. The defense experts 
testified either that a positive identification could not be 
made or that the defendant's teeth did not make the 
mark./d. at 393,356 N.E.2d at 1356. Despite this 
disagreement, the defendant was convicted. Interesting-
ly, one of the experts in that case subsequently wrote that 
"[r]ecently discovered evidence proves that Milone ... is 
innocent." Levine, Forensic Dentistry: Our Most Contro-
versif1/ Case, in legal Medicine Annual73 (C. Wecht ed. 
1978). 
Similarly in People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 
879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1226 
(1985), seven experts testified, four for the prosecution 
andthreefor the defense. While the prosecution experts 
testified that the bite mark on a murder victim had been 
made by the defendant, the defense experts testified that 
not only was the mark not made by the defendant but 
that the mark "was not a bite mark at all." /d. at 58, 468 
N.E.2d at 886, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 713. In addition, the ex-
perts disagreed about the proper methods that may be 
used for the comparison. The prosecution experts used 
two methods of comparison. First, they compared a 
stone model of the defendant's dentition and i mpres-
sions made in aluwax from the model with life-size photo-
graphs of the mark on the victim. Second, they made 
photo-to"photo comparisons of the victim's mark and a 
-bite-mark-knowntohave been made by the defendant on 
human tissue four years earlier. /d. In contrast, the de-
fense experts compared transparencies made from a 
model of the defendant's teeth with a photograph of the 
mark on the victim. The transparencies were then laid 
over the photograph. /d. The defense experts, however, 
conceded that there was no completely objective method 
for identifying bite marks and that each method ultimate-
ly relied on the judgment of the individual expert. 
ADMISSIBILITY 
Courts have admitted bite mark evidence in a number 
of different types of cases: 
Homicide prosecutions: State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 
P.2d563 (1978); People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d 100, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 350 (1975); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385,356 
N.E.2d 1350 (1976); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 
273 (1981); S!ate v. Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 386 A.2d 1125 (1978). 
Rape prosecutions: People v. Johnson, 8111. App.3d 457, 289 
N.E.2d 722 (1972); People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 484 
N.Y.S.2d 577 (1984); State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 
S.E.2d 625 (1982); State v. Routh, 30 Or. App. 901, 568 P.2d 
704 (1977); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 
(1979). 
Child abuse cases: Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev_ 289, 291 n_1, 
646 P.2d 558,559 n.1 (1982). 
The typical bite mark case has involved the identification 
of the defendant by matching his dentition with a mark 
left on the victim. In several cases, however, the victim's 
teeth have been compared with marks on the defen-
4 
dant's body. See Bradford v. State, 460 So.2d 926, 929-30 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 
262,271, 484 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580-83 (1984). Other courts 
have admitted evidence of a bite mark on the defendant 
without expert testimony. See Ex parte Smith, 72 F. Supp. 
935 (M.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); People v. 
Stewart, 110 Ill. App.2d 435, 249 N.E.2d 725 (1969), aff'd, 
46 111.2d 125, 262 N.E.2d 911 (1970); State v. McClinton, 
265 S.C. 171, 217 S.E.2d 584 (1975). Several cases have 
involved bite marks on foodstuff. See State v. Oritz, 198 
Conn. 220, 502 A.2d 400 (1985); Doyle v. State, 159 Tex. 
Grim. 310, 263 S.W.2d 779 (1954). 
People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 
(1975), is the leading bite mark case. See generally Note, 
The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
309 (1978); Vale, Sognnaes, Felando & Noguchi, Unusual 
Three-Dimensional Bite Mark Evidence in a Homicide 
Case, 21 J. Forensic Sci. 642 (1976). The court in Marx 
avoided applying the Frye test, which requires accep-
tance of a novel technique by the scientific community as 
a prerequisite to admissibility. Frye v. United States, 293 
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Giannelli, The Admissibility 
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980). (The Ohio 
Supreme Court rejected Frye in State v. Williams, 4 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983)). 
According to the court in Marx, the Frye test "finds its 
rational basis in the degree to which the trier of fact must 
accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of 
proof or disproof in court and not even generally accept-
ed outside the courtroom." 54 Cal. App.3d at 110, 126 
Cal. Rptr. 355-56. The court went on to hold that bite 
mark evidence did not involve such acceptance by the 
jury. The basis on which the expert reached his 
conclusions-models, photographs, and X-rays-were 
shown to the trier of fact and the expert's conclusions 
were verifiable by the court. Thus, the "court did not have 
to sacrifice its independence and common sense in 
evaluating" the evidence./d. at 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356. 
Other courts have also admitted bite mark evidence 
without applying the Frye test. See State v. Garrison, 120 
Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1978); People v. Watson, 75 Cal. 
App.3d 384, 142 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1977); State v. Oritz, 198 
Conn. 220, 502 A.2d 400, 403 (1985); Bundy v. State, 455 
So.2d 330, 348-49 (Fla. 1984); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. 
App.3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976); People v. Johnson, 
8 Ill. App.3d 457, 289 N.E.2d 722 (1972); Niehaus v. State, 
2651nd. 655,359 N.E.2d 513, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 
(1977); State v. Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 605 P.2d 135 
(1980); Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 646 P.2d 558 
(1982); State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 N.E.2d 625 
(1982); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 273 (1981); 
Kennedy v. State, 640 P.2d 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); 
State v. Routh, 30 Or. App. 901, 568 P.2d 704 (1977); State 
v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979); Patterson v. 
State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974); State v. 
Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 386 A.2d 1125 (1978). See also People 
v. Queen, 130 Ill. App.3d 523, 474 N.E.2d 786 (1985). 
Courts applying the Frye general acceptance stan-
dard, however, have reached the same result. See United 
States v. Martin, 13 M.J. 66, 67-68 (C.M.A. 1982); People 
v. Slone, 76 Cal. App.3d 611, 623-24, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 
68-69 (1978); State v. Kleypas, 602 S.W.2d 863, 868-70 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 573 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); 
People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 49-50, 429 N.E.2d 100, 
103-04,444 N.Y.S.2d 581,584-85 (1981); People v. 
~ Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262,267,484 N.Y.S.2d 577, 581 
.·· (1984); People v. Smith, 110 Misc.2d 118, 124-26, 443 
N.Y.S.2d 551, 556-57 (Cty. Ct. 1981). 
Judicial Notice 
No reported case has rejected bite mark evidence. 
Indeed, its acceptance is so well-established that the 
New York Court of Appeals has held that its validity need 
not be proved in every case: 
The reliability of bite mark evidence as a means of identifi-
cation is sufficiently established in the scientific community 
to make such evidence admissible in a criminal case, with-
out separately establishing scientific reliability in each case, 
but subject, of course, to the establishment by foundation 
evidence of the authenticity of the materials used and pro-
priety of the procedure followed in the particular case and to 
cross-examination intended to test the reliability of the con-
clusion reached in that case. People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 
42, 45, 429 N.E.2d 100, 101,, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (1981). 
See also People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 63,468 N.E.2d 
879, 889, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 716 (1984), cert. denied, 105 
S.Ct. 1226 (1985). In short, courts may judicially notice 
the general validity or bite mark evidence. Judicial notice, 
however, does not extend'to the validity of an identifica-
tion in a particular case. 
Expert Qualifications 
Although the qualifications of experts who have testi-
fied in the bite mark cases have been challenged in 
some cases, these challenges have failed. See People v. 
Williams, 128 Ill. App.3d 384, 397, 470 N.E.2d 1140, 
1149-50 (1984); State v. Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 132-33, 
605 P.2d 135, 139-40 (1980); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 
12-13, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981). Most of the experts 
have been experienced forensic odontologists. In one 
case, however, the court ruled a dentist qualified even 
though the comparison in issue was the first he had 
made. Niehaus v. State, 265 Ind. 655, 359 N.E.2d 513, 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). 
Spoliation Evidence 
Evidence that a defendant has attempted to alter his 
teeth after learning of the prosecution's intention to intro-
duce bite mark evidence is admissible as spoliation evi-
dence. In one case the expert detected new tooth frac-
tures at the time he attempted to cast the defendant's 
dentition. The defendant was aware that impressions of 
his teeth would be taken but claimed that the fractures 
occurred when he bit a bone at a meal. The expert testi-
fied that the fractures had to have resulted in some other 
way. The court held that evidence of the defendant's 
conduct was admissible: "The spoliation of evidence 
evinces a consciousness of guilt and is admissible for 
that reason." State v. Turner, 633 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1982). 
Constitutional Challenges 
Defendants have challenged the admissibility of bite 
mark evidence on the grounds that compelling them to 
submit to a dental examination is unconstitutional. 
Courts have ruled that obtaining dental impressions from 
a defendant does not violate the Fourth Amendment's 
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proscription against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures: United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. 144, 154-55 
(E. D. Pa.), aff'd sub. nom. Appeal of Ehly, 506 F.2d 1050 
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975); People v. 
Milone, 43111. App.3d 385, 390-91, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 
(1976); People v. Smith, 110 Misc.2d 118, 122-23, 443 
N.Y.S.2d 551, 555 (Cty. Ct. 1982); State v. Howe, 136 Vt. 
53, 64, 386 A.2d 1125, 1131-32 (1978). The Ohio court of 
appeals took this position in State v. Sapsford, 22 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 488 N.E.2d 218 (1983). 
Defendants have also challenged the compelled pro-
duction of dental impressions on Fifth Amendment 
grounds. Courts have also rejected the self-incrimination 
argument. See United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. 
144, 154-55 (E. D. Pa.)(obtaining dental impressions from 
a defendant is not compelled self-incrimination), aff'd, 
506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 
(1975); State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 478 A.2d 227, 
240 (1984)(state constitution), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 
1749 (1985); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385, 392, 356 
N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (1976); People v. Smith, 110 Misc.2d 
118, 121-22, 443 N .Y.S.2d 551, 554-55 (Cty. Ct. 1982); 
People v. Allah, 84 Misc.2d 500, 502, 376 N.Y.S.2d 399, 
401 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
The Fifth Amendment cases rely on the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966), in which the Court held that the privilege against 
self-incrimination covers only communicative or testimon-
ial evidence, not physical or real evidence. According to 
the Court: 
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an 
accused's communications, whatever form they might take .. 
. . On the other hand, both federal and state courts have 
usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion 
to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measure-
ments, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, 
to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular 
gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often ex-
pressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar 
against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but 
that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the 
source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it. /d. 
at 763-64. 
The Ohio court of appeals in State v. Sapsford, 22 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 488 N.E. 218 (1983), also adopted the 
Schmerber reasoning. 
In one case the accused argued that his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was violated. The court rejected 
this argument, finding that the taking of nontestimonial 
evidence was not a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecu-
tion. State v. Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 63, 386 A.2d 1125, 1131 
(1978). The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.218 (1967), in which the 
Court stated: 
[Preparatory steps in the Government's investigation such 
as analyzing of) fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair 
[are not] critical stages at which the accused has the right to 
the presence of counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of 
science and technology is sufficiently available, and the 
variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has 
the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Gov-
ernment's case at trial through the ordinary processes of 
cross-examination of Government's expert witnesses and 
the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. The 
';. 
denialofarightto have his counseLpresent at such 
analyses does not therefore violate the the Sixth 
Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is 
minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stage 
· might derogate from his right to a fair trial. /d. at 227-28. 
RELATED ISSUES 
laboratory Reports 
In State v. Stokes, 433 So.2d 96 (La. 1983), the defen-
dant was compelled to $Ubmit to the taking of dental 
impressions because wounds resembling bite marks 
were found ori the victim. After comparing the defen-
dant's teeth impressions with the bite marks, the state's 
expert concluded that there was not enough evidence to 
make a positive identification. A copy of his written report 
was presented to the defense and the defense attempted 
to have the report admitted as evidence. The state su-
preme court upheld the trial court's ruling excluding the 
report as inadmissible hearsay. According to the court, 
the report did not qualify for admission as a business 
record: "Without the testimony of the doctor, it would be 
difficult to assess the validity of the test upon which the 
opinions of the doctor expressed in the report were 
based." /d. at 103. 
Stokes is inconsistent with evidentiary rules in other 
jurisdictions. For example, Ohio Rule of Evidence 803(8), 
which governs the public records exception to the hear-
say rule, precludes the admission of police records "un-
less offered by [the] defendant." Although Federal Rule 
803(8)(B) does not contain comparable language, it has 
been interpreted to permit the introduction of police 
reports when offered by the defense. See United States v. 
Smith,5?1f.?<:l~!)7, 968-69 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See 
generally P. Giannelli & E. lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence ch. 6 (1986)(1aboratory reports). 
Right to Defense Witnesses 
In Thorton v. State, 255 Ga. 434, 339 S.E.2d 240 
(1986), the state obtained dental impressions from the 
defendant, so that his teeth could be compared to marks 
appearing on an autopsy photograph of the victim. The 
defense then moved for the appointment of a defense 
expert at state expense because the defendant was indi-
gent. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the defen-
dant was entitled to the appointment of "an appropriate 
professional, whose experience, at minimum, is substan-
tially equivalent to that of the state's expert witness." 
Although the court did not cite it, the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S.Ct. 1087 
(1985), supports its ruling. Ake involved a request for 
psychiatric assistance in a case which raised an insanity 
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defense. The Court ruled: "We hold that when a defen-
dant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at 
the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at 
trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide 
access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the 
defendant cannot otherwise afford one." /d. at 1092. See 
generally P. Giannelli & E. lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence ch. 4 (1986)(securing expert assistance). 
Discovery 
In State v. Adams, 481 A.2d 718 (R.I. 1984), the prose-
cution. failed to disclose a bite mark report, despite a 
defense request for the discovery of scientific reports. 
Tne~RnooelslandSupreme Court held that the deliber-
ate failure to discldse such a report was reversible error. 
The court also held that a cast impression of the bite 
mark was tangible evidence and therefore also subject to 
·discovery. According to the court, the state's failure to 
disclose may have hindered the defense: "Had the cast 
impression been made available to defendant prior to 
trial, he would have been able to obtain an independent 
forensic dentist to examine the case and the impression 
taken of his own mouth. The results of such a test could 
have been very significant to defendant." /d. at 724. 
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